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On the use of willingness-to-pay studies in health
Abstract
Health policy makers know that their decisions affect the chances of well-being and survival of
individuals and that they implicitly are valuing human lives. Evidence with regard to willingness-to-pay
(WTP) informs about the value individuals themselves put on these chances; it thus holds the promise of
contributing to consistent decisions that lead to an improved benefit-cost ratio of health services for
(potential) patients. However, such improvement is more likely if information about WTP is used by
competing health insurers rather than the government.
On the use of willingness-to-pay studies in health 
PETER Z W E I F E L * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies occupy a particularly important place in health care. 
Policy makers, knowing that their decisions affect the chances of well-being and survival 
of many individuals, sense that they ultimately are valuing human lives. However, put-
ting a value on human life is such a contentious issue that actual health policy is formu-
lated without reference to it. This has the unfortunate consequence that questions such 
as, "Is it worthwhile to include this new drug in the country's health insurance benefit 
package?", or "Should public resources be spent on subsidizing hospitals rather than on 
schools?" cannot be answered in a consistent way. 
Evidence with regard to WTP holds the promise of remedying this situation in at least 
three ways. First, being rooted in marginal analysis, it puts emphasis squarely on mar-
ginal variations of survival probabilities, which is far more acceptable than the "live or 
die" formulations often propagated by the health professions. Second, WTP is designed 
to elicit the preferences of consumers and voters, serving to increase the degree of ra-
tionality in policy decisions of e.g. insurers and politicians. Third, to the extent that con-
sumers' and voters' preferences are reasonably consistent and stable over time, insurers 
and politicians, who take decisions in accordance with WTP evidence, have some assur-
ance that their own chances of survival in the (political) market are intact. 
The objective of this paper therefore is to show how WTP studies can be used to map 
the preferences of individuals with regard to health and health care. This makes evi-
dence with regard to WTP a tool in the hands of policy makers. However, the paper 
also intends to advance the proposition that this tool is more likely to be used in the con-
sumers' interest if put in the hands of competing insurers rather than other so-called 
complementary agents in health, in particular the government. 
Accordingly, this contribution is structured as follows. The next section contains an 
exposition of the theoretical basis of WTP as applied to health, as well as the derivation 
of the optimal allocation in terms of probability of good health vs consumption from the 
individual's point of view. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons why individuals 
as prospective patients frequently fail to achieve their optimum in a physician-patient 
relationship. This failure creates a market for so-called complementary agents, who pro-
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mise to patch up the physician-patient relationship, typically by taking over fee negotia-
tions. The third section is devoted to an assessment of the use made of WTP information 
by the two polar types of complementary agents, viz. health insurers under the pressure 
of competition and the government. At a given point in time, competing insurers are 
more likely to heed the preferences of their clients as expressed by evidence with regard 
to WTP. The analysis is broadened to encompass changes that shift the consumer's opti-
mum, such as technological change in medicine. Here, the finding is that insurers will 
adapt their products more quickly. However, government may use WTP information 
for benchmarking in the spirit of New Public Management. In this way, WTP studies 
may permit the government to improve its efficiency. The paper ends with a summary 
and a few concluding remarks. 
2. THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF WTP AS APPLIED TO HEALTH 
The crucial feature of health is that it does not constitute a tangible stock that can be held, 
controlled, and traded (see, however, the stock formulation by GROSSMAN, 1972). 
Rather, what individuals can influence is their probability to be in good health in some 
future period. For simplicity, let n denote the probability of being ill (state s) during a 
short period (a week, say). Accordingly, the probability of being in good health (1 - 7r; 
state h) constitutes one of the two goods to be contemplated, the other being consump-
tion services C. Let the individual maximize expected utility EU. Then, an indifference 
curve in ((1 - 7r), C)-space is given by 
dEU = 0 = d7r. Ua[Ca] + 7T^dCs + (1 - *)jj^dCh + {-dix)Uh[Ch\. (1) 
This can be solved for the slope of the indifference curve (setting dCs — dCu — dC), 
dC _ Uh[Ch]-Ua[Cs] 
d(l-TT) ^ + ( 1 - ^ (2) 
Without further justification, assume the marginal rate of substitution between the two 
goods to be decreasing as usual, resulting in the graph shown in figure 1. Now, to relate 
the graph more closely to a policy-making context, consider a sequence of T periods, in 
each of which there is a probability of (1 - n) of being in the healthy state. It follows 
from the binary distribution that the expected number of periods in the healthy state 
(before a change to the sick state occurs) is given by ET)X = l/ir. Since this is a mono-
tonic transformation, the preference field can be drawn in a (C,ETh) -space without 
loss of generality. In the following, the argument will be couched in terms of consump-
tion (C) and expected number of healthy periods (ETh). 
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Up to this point, the existence of a marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and "health" (more precisely, the expected number of healthy periods over a future 
comprising T periods, with T > ETh) has been established. But this marginal rate of sub-
stitution is nothing but the individual's marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for more 
time in good health because it indicates how much in terms of consumption he or she is 
prepared to give up for an additional period in good health. According to the model pre-
sented here, MWTP is predicted (1) to depend on the initial endowment in terms of con-
sumption and expected number of healthy periods (originally chances for good health 
(1 - 7r)); (2) to decrease when ETh approaches its maximum value of T; (3) to increase 
but at a decreasing rate when a larger gain in ETh is being considered. It can also be 
shown that (4) MWTP increases with initial consumption (or equivalently, wealth; see 
ZWEIFEL and BREYER, 1997, ch. 2.3 for details). 
Now, members of the medical profession and many laymen would doubt the existence 
of a stable preference field as displayed in figure 1. Indeed, human behavior often is de-
cried as, "Not giving a dime for health as long as one is healthy, but willing to spend 
one's entire fortune once one is sick". This seems to be evidence in favor of unstable pre-
ferences, with MWTP strongly state-dependent. If true, the argument would severely 
limit the usefulness of evidence with regard to WTP for policy purposes. However, it 
can be shown that the state-dependence of observed MWTP may follow from a state-de-
pendence of the feasible set. 
Figure 1 also contains a transformation curve; to prepare for state-dependence, it is 
assumed to hold for a current period in good health. From the origin, the curve starts 
with a positive slope because when (1 - TT) increases, the expected number of healthy 
periods ETh increases as well, providing for healthy time that serves either to generate 
labor income (which can be used to finance consumption goods) or leisure time (which 
can be used to produce consumption services). Thus, for small values, healthy time has 
the character of an investment good, helping to increase consumption services as well. 
The transformation curve reaches its maximum where the additional resources spent on 
increasing the chances of being in good health (and hence, expected healthy time) result 
in an equivalent gain in resources in terms of time available for work and investment in 
health (see ZWEIFEL and BREYER, 1997, ch. 3.3 for details). As is evident from figure 1, 
at the optimum (symbolized by Q*), health has turned into a consumption good, imply-
ing that more time spent in good health entails a sacrifice in terms of consumption. 
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Figure 1: Preferences and possibilities in the production of health chances 
1 - 7 1 
In figure 2 a second transformation curve is shown, depicting the feasible set given for an 
individual in bad health during the current period. This means that his or her productiv-
ity both in the labor market and in household production is reduced for at least part of 
the planning period T. Accordingly, this transformation curve runs lower and reaches its 
maximum value ETh sooner than its counterpart which holds in the case of good current 
health. In order to demonstrate that this difference rather than an instability in prefer-
ence may be the source of observed state-dependence of MWTP, two assumptions are 
made: 
(a) preferences are homothetic; 
(b) sickness in the current period affects the individual as a producer of future healthy 
time more strongly than as a producer of future consumption. 
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Figure 2: State-dependence in the production of healthy time 
Assumption (a) is often introduced as a matter of course. Yet, at least in the domain of 
household consumption expenditure, work based on flexible utility functions (such as 
the translog) has come to the conclusion that homotheticity of preferences is confirmed 
by the evidence (MANSER and MCDONALD, 1984). No econometric evidence with a 
bearing on assumption (b) seems to exist. However, to the extent that social health in-
surance provides a replacement income in the event of ill health, the flow of consump-
tion goods is little affected by health status, while the probability of being healthy is re-
duced to zero by definition as long as the sickness extends into future periods. By 
necessity, this lowers the expected number of future healthy periods. 
Given these assumptions, the two optima Q* (good current health) and Q** (bad cur-
rent health) can be compared as follows. When moving towards the origin on the ray 
OQ*, the slope of the indifference curve remains the same according to assumption (a). 
However, the slope of the transformation curve must become steeper on average for as-
sumption (b) to be satisfied. This means that the optimum Q** cannot possibly lie on the 
ray through the origin; indeed, it must lie above that ray, where the slope of the indiffer-
ence curve is greater (in absolute value). However, this also implies that at Q**, the mar-
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ginal rates of transformation and substitution must be larger than at Q*. In other words, 
the revealed MWTP for additional healthy time is greater if the current period is one of 
bad health than if it is one of good health. The observed MWTP thus turns out to be 
state- dependent not because of any instability of preferences but because of the depen-
dence of productive capabilities on current health status, which seems a very natural as-
sumption. 
Conclusion 1: The observed instability of revealed marginal willingness-to-pay for 
health (low when healthy, high when ill) need not be caused by an instability of under-
lying preferences but may well be caused by the dependence of the individual's produc-
tive capabilities on the current state of health. 
Thus, the argument that individuals' preferences with regard to health and health care 
are too fickle to provide a basis for policy making need not be accepted. This is not to 
say that measuring true MWTP for health is without problems, quite to the contrary. 
While in principle, it is possible to infer the individual's MWTP from the equality be-
tween the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation (and 
hence actual behavior) at the optimum points Q* and Q**, there are at least two reasons 
for important deviations. First, the rate of transformation is biased because of insurance 
coverage. With a coinsurance rate of 10 percent (as applies to out-patient medical care in 
Swiss social health insurance), the sacrifice of one Swiss franc's worth of consumption in 
effect buys ten times as much medical care as without insurance coverage. Thus, the 
transformation curve looks ten times flatter than in figure 1 to an insured individual 
who considers using out-patient medical care. The second reason is that as soon as indi-
viduals rely on medical care, they are not very likely to reach the optimum Q** (bad cur-
rent health). This is due to a failure of the physician-patient relationship, to be ex-
pounded in the next section. 
3. FAILURE OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
AND THE MARKET FOR COMPLEMENTARY AGENTS IN HEALTH 
In decision situations characterized by a marked lack of information, individuals often 
rely on the expertise of a specialized agent. This of course raises the issue of how to en-
sure that the agent, while pursuing his or her own objectives, can be made to also ad-
vance the interests of the uninformed principal. The generic solution to this problem 
(known as the principal-agent relationship) is for the principal to devise a payment 
scheme that provides the appropriate incentives to the agent (HOLMSTRÖM, 1979, L E -
VINTHAL, 1988). Basically, the payment function has the following structure, 
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«"[*-?*(*)]_* ,.. aj^P-
df{B\g') ( 3 ) 
with E := da 
/(%*) 
Its left hand side (LHS) is a ratio of two marginal utilities, which are both decreasing in 
wealth if risk aversion is assumed. The one in the numerator is the principal's marginal 
utility, evaluated at the value of his residual claim: out of the outcome 9 achieved thanks 
to the contract with the agent, the principal must pay the agent to the tune of p*9. In the 
present context, the principal is the uninformed patient, and the outcome is the resulting 
state of health, valued in financial terms. Now, given that there exists a MWTP for addi-
tional healthy time, this MWTP can be extrapolated to indicate the MWTP for being in 
some better health status (see ZWEIFEL and BREYER, 1997, ch. 2.3 for details). Thus the 
requirement of expressing 9 in monetary terms does not pose insurmountable problems, 
at least at the conceptual level. 
The denominator on the LHS contains the agent's marginal utility, which by assump-
tion only depends on the payment received. In the present context, the agent is the treat-
ing physician. In sum, the ratio on the LHS of equation (3) takes on a high value when 
the physician's marginal utility is small, implying that he gets the lion's share of the out-
come 9. What circumstances make it in the patient's best interest to let the physician 
have the lion's share of the benefits that originate from the transaction? 
The answer to this question is given by the parameters on the right hand side (RHS) 
of equation (3), which describe the properties of the optimal payment function. Its first 
component is a fixed sum, indicated by A, a Lagrangean multiplier that emanates from 
the so-called participation constraint characterizing the principal's decision-making pro-
blem. For, payment must be sufficient to induce the agent to sign up with the principal. 
For example, a physician who has lucrative alternative uses of his time will have a high 
value of A. 
The second component of payment consists of two parts. The Lagrangean multiplier \x 
reflects the importance of the so-called incentive compatibility constraint: Payment 
must honor costly marginal effort undertaken by the agent. In the case of a surgeon e.g., 
\i takes on a large value because failure to exert sufficient effort can be a life-or-death 
issue for the patient. However, \x interacts with E, which symbolizes the stochastic ana-
log of marginal productivity. In fact, E indicates how much probability mass in the den-
sity function of outcomes is shifted towards more favorable outcomes in response to a 
marginal increase of physician effort, da, relative to the existing probability mass (see 
figure 1 again). In the case of a surgeon, E typically takes on a high value in that one 
hour more of his effort may increase the likelihood of patient survival by as much as 50 
or even 100 percent. 
In sum, it is optimal for a prospective patient to pay the physician (or more generally, 
the provider of health care) very well if (1) violation of the participation constraint has a 
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marked impact on the patient's welfare, or (2) violation of the incentive compatibility 
constraint has a marked impact on welfare and/or (3) marginal variations of physician 
effort have a substantial impact on the likelihood of a favorable treatment outcome. 
However, estimating the parameters that determine the optimal payment function is a 
very difficult task for the prospective patient. In particular, condition (3) involves the es-
timation of E, the stochastic marginal effectiveness of a health care provider. While in-
dividuals with a chronic condition may be able to gauge E, few are capable of this in the 
case of unfamiliar diseases or rare interventions. During full anesthesia e.g., the patient 
cannot observe the surgeon's effort at all! Even under less incapacitating circumstances, 
the patient usually has difficulty inferring actual physician effort, which importantly 
amounts to a judicious choice of treatment alternatives rather than observable activities 
such as giving a shot or prescribing a drug. Thus, the asymmetry of information fre-
quently is too severe to permit the uninformed patient to identify the optimal payment 
function. However, failure to do so results in suboptimal treatment outcomes since the 
optimality condition (3) is violated. 
In terms of figure 1, deviations from condition (3) cause both the indifference curves 
and the feasible set in the sick state to be misrepresented since the patient does not 
know the true probability (1 — 7r) with which he will be back in the healthy state. This 
means that his or her indifference curve exhibits a biased slope; since perceived (1 — 7r) 
is lower than true (1 — 7r), it runs too steep (see equation 2). At the same time, the per-
ceived expected number of future healthy periods ETh falls short of the feasible quantity 
ETh as well, resulting in a feasible set with too low a maximum value of ETh. In the re-
levant neighborhood of the true optimum Q**, the transformation curve therefore has 
too great a slope, too. Evidently, one cannot generally predict whether the chosen value 
of (1 - 7r) and ETh and hence the amount of health care demanded will exceed or fall 
short of the true optimum. 
Conclusion 2: Frequently, the prospective patient's attempt to control the behavior of 
the physician through incentive-compatible payment fails due to the impossibility of 
identifying the optimal payment function. As a consequence, the true optimum in the 
sick state cannot be reached. 
This specter of market failure creates a market for what shall be called complementary 
agents. Complementary agents (CA) can offer to remedy the physician-patient relation-
ship by (a) providing the information necessary to estimate stochastic productivity E, or 
(b) negotiating the payment function on behalf of the prospective patient. More gener-
ally, this task includes selecting those providers of health care who are willing to con-
clude contracts containing the incentives that are optimal for a particular type of insured 
person. For reasons described more fully in ZWEIFEL, LEHMANN and STEINMANN 
(2000), solution (b) dominates. In the following, discussion will be limited to the two po-
lar types of CA, viz. competitive health insurers and the government. Other CA include 
medical associations, employers, and national health insurance. 
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4. COMPLEMENTARY AGENTS AND THEIR USE OF WTP INFORMATION 
Competitive health insurers and governments will make quite different use of WTP in-
formation, with differing implications for efficiency. In the following, it is assumed that 
health insurers may engage in product competition. In view of the theory of the preced-
ing section, this includes the development of contracts that give providers of health care 
services the incentives that are optimal for a given type of insured person. Insurers and 
governments as users of WTP information are compared in a one-period in this section, 
with comparison in a dynamic context to follow below. 
To negotiate optimal contracts, insurers must have the right to engage in selective 
contracting (this is generally possible for private health insurers but also for Health 
Maintenance Organizations and Preferred Provider Organizations in the United States, 
as well as for Swiss sick funds in the domain of complementary coverage). Thus, they 
want to include certain physicians, hospitals, and pharmaceutical suppliers while exclud-
ing others. Again due to the pressure of competition, the criteria for selection must be 
those that the insured individuals would apply if they had the necessary information. Eli-
gible providers of service must therefore exhibit a favorable benefit-cost ratio (ex-
pressed by insured individuals' WTP), which they achieve only if willing to operate un-
der the appropriate incentives defined in equation (3) above. 
Only insurers whose benefits package contains those service providers and medical 
technologies for which there is a high rather than low or zero WTP on the part of the 
plan's (marginal) enrollees will be successful in the marketplace. Competitive health in-
surers therefore have an incentive to establish their clients' WTP for existing and new 
providers and medical technologies. In this way, information regarding WTP is a market-
ing instrument for health insurers. It is efficiency-enhancing because it permits them to 
structure contracts in a way that helps insured individuals to get closer to their optimum 
in the sick state (point Q** in figure 3). 
Turning to the government as the CA, one notes that it usually tries to keep its outlay 
on health care at a fixed percentage of its budget, which translates into a fixed percen-
tage of the GDP as long as the public sector grows in step with the economy. This be-
comes most evident in the United Kingdom, where the cabinet fixes the share of the 
budget devoted to the National Health Service. In Germany, the quest for a stable ratio 
of public health care expenditure to labor incomes has a long tradition. It is combined 
with budgeting for the major components of the health care bill, such as out-patient 
care, hospital care, and drugs (HENKE, 1992). But even the government of the United 
States is concerned about the share of its budget that goes to covering the deficit of its 
public programs in health, viz. Medicare and Medicaid. 
20 PETER ZWEIFEL 
Figure 3: True and perceived production possibilities for health in the sick state 
To the extent that politicians can pursue their own objectives at least between elections, 
there is no guarantee that the government's optimum (Q" in figure 3) coincides with the 
representative consumer's optimum (Q**). Indeed, this discrepancy is the consequence 
of the government's ignoring any existing evidence concerning the MWTP of consumers. 
Allocating fixed shares to the different types of care also is unlikely to reflect the rela-
tive MWTP for these services in the population. 
Moreover, the government as the negotiating CA is subject to at least two additional 
influences that cause departures from the optima of the representative consumer as 
shown in figure 2. Both effects have been discussed at some length in the public choice 
literature (DOWNS, 1957). First, when entering negotiations a democratic government 
must keep an eye on its chance of re-election. This is an important consideration when 
dealing with physicians, who can muster considerable popular support in their favor. 
Physicians see many patients, the majority of whom are of advanced age and therefore 
particularly likely to participate in elections. Thus, they are able to create a pressure 
group at low cost (ZWEIFEL and EICHENBERGER, 1992). In view of this fact, the govern-
ment as the negotiating CA must satisfy medical demands to a greater extent than do 
competitive insurers (see ZWEIFEL, LEHMANN and STEINMANN, 2000, for a formal 
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model). It is therefore less likely to either gather or use information with regard to WTP 
in an attempt to come up with contracts that are optimal in the sense of equation (3). 
The second departure from the consumer's optimum derives from the fact that the 
government usually delegates actual negotiations to an agency. However, agencies are 
not subject to a re-election constraint, which permits their directors to pursue their per-
sonal objectives in the guise of power, prestige, and pay (NISKANEN, 1971). Now, for 
power and prestige it is preferable for such a director to have nationwide negotiations 
on a uniform fee schedule and a uniform benefits package. Again, this implies little in-
terest in gathering and using evidence on WTP, which usually takes on different values 
depending on the parameters discussed in the theoretical section. On the other hand, fig-
ure 1 as well as equation (3) make it clear that optimal solutions depend on the type of 
prospective patient (as well as on the individual situation of a service provider). Uniform 
contracts therefore harm the interests of many prospective patients, quite likely the ma-
jority. In all, these considerations lead up to 
Conclusion 3: Within a given period, evidence with regard to WTP is more likely to 
contribute to efficiency in health care if used by competing health insurers than by the 
government. 
To complement the analysis, focus is now shifted to dynamic considerations. Let us as-
sume an advance in medical technology. As shown in figure 3, this serves to enlarge the 
feasible set of individuals if the current period is one of bad health. Without further 
proof, it is assumed that the shift of the transformation curve in the direction of a higher 
expected number of periods in good health (ETh) is more marked than in the direction 
of consumption services (C). This entails a transition to a new optimal point such as Q***, 
which typically contains more health (and health care services since their productivity 
relative to preventive effort on the part of the individual has increased). 
Competitive insurers will note that they must adjust the payment function because 
the technological advance has increased physicians' stochastic efficiency (parameter E 
in equation (3)). Specifically, they have to pay more in the best interest of their enrol-
lees, especially by reinforcing the incentive component^ • E). Moreover, competition 
for enrollees will cause them to include the new treatment alternative in their benefits 
package without much delay, permitting consumers to shift to the new optimum Q*** in 
the state of bad health. 
By way of contrast, the government will try to maintain the share of health in its bud-
get and the GDP at the value it deems optimal. This value typically changes as a function 
of relative lobbying power rather than as a function of technological change in medicine. 
As shown above, this value is lower than that of the representative consumer as a rule, 
implying that technological change results in a discrepancy between the optima that in-
creases over time (see Q** vs. Q" and Q*** vs. Q'" in figure 3). 
However, the ex ante fixing of budgets can also have an efficiency-enhancing effect. 
Budgeting is known as a way to increase the efficiency of public agencies (SCHEDLER 
and PROELLER, 2000). Service providers in the National Health Service may have a 
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strengthened incentive to keep within their budget, which is efficiency-enhancing as long 
as the quality of their services can be monitored. Now technological change usually 
makes it easier for public agencies to meet their targets. To the extent that this also holds 
true of health care, the effective production point Q'" may be closer to the true transfor-
mation curve than the one before the technological change (Q"). All in all, technological 
change in medicine entails two opposite efficiency effects with the government as the 
negotiating CA. On the one hand, it tends to boost the gap between the optima on the 
efficiency frontier. On the other hand, it tends to reduce the gap between actual and 
technologically efficient production. 
Conclusion 4: Competitive health insurers are constrained to adjust their negotiations 
to the modified WTP of their members in the wake of technological change in medicine. 
The government is not subject to such a constraint but may profit from the fact that it 
becomes easier for the providers in health care to meet the specified targets. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This special issue is evidence of the fact that considerable progress in the measurement 
of (marginal) willingness-to-pay for health and health care has been made during the 
past few years. This development gives rise to the questions, Who will use this informa-
tion, and What are the chances that it will contribute to efficiency in the health care sec-
tor? The present paper seeks to provide answers to these questions. First, it shows that 
the often-decried behavior, "Do not spend a dime on health as long as healthy, but spend 
your entire fortune when sick" need not be the expression of unstable preferences. 
Rather, this may be the consequence of a state-dependent feasible set when the indivi-
dual is seen as a producer of his or her probability of being in good health in the future 
on the one hand and consumption services on the other (Conclusion 1). 
However, in the sick state individuals rely on a health care provider as a rule. The 
physician-patient relationship in particular can be cast in a principal-agent framework, 
where the uninformed principal controls the unobservable effort of the agent through 
the judicious choice of a payment function. It is argued that this solution usually breaks 
down when it comes to medical care because the informational asymmetry is so marked 
as to prevent identification of the optimal payment function by the prospective patient 
(Conclusion 2). This threat of a market failure calls for complementary agents, who typi-
cally negotiate a payment function on behalf of the consumer. 
The two cases of complementary agents considered here are competitive health in-
surers and the government. Now, under the pressure of competition for enrollees, in-
surers want to use information about willingness-to-pay to structure their benefit 
packages, excluding providers and treatments for which there is little or no willingness-
to-pay. Information about this quantity in the hands of insurers thus serves to increase 
efficiency in health care. By way of contrast, a democratic government, constrained to 
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gain pivotal votes, has to take physicians' interests into due account, implying that the 
outcome of fee negotiations cannot only reflect consumers' willingness to pay for health 
and health care regardless of the amount of information gathered (Conclusion 3). 
Finally, the comparison between competitive health insurers and the government can 
be extended to cover the speed of adjustment of negotiations to e.g. an advance in med-
ical technology. This results in a modification of both the individuals' preference fields 
(caused by a changed probability of being healthy in the future) and their feasibility 
sets (due to the concomitant increase in the expected number of healthy future periods). 
These modifications affect the optimal payment function and the demand for medical 
care. While competitive insurers must take this change into account, the government, at-
tempting to keep the cost of fulfilling its promises in terms of health down, often does 
not want to increase payments for health care. It thus tends to disregard information 
about willingness to pay in this context but may still use it as a New Public Management 
tool to improve the principal-agent relationship between its agencies and the providers 
of health care. However, a more efficient provision of health care allows individuals to 
move closer to the true frontiers of their feasible sets (Conclusion 4). Thus, information 
about willingness-to-pay for health and health care in combination with technological 
change in medicine may in fact help governments to catch up with competitive insurers 
as complementary agents in health. 
In sum, therefore, information about willingness-to-pay is crucial in patching up the 
deficiencies in the physician-patient relationship. Its contribution to improving effi-
ciency has been found to be greater if competitive insurers are in charge, serving as com-
plementary agents. However, the importance of competitive conditions in the markets 
for health insurance must be emphasized. In the absence of competitive pressure, health 
insurers have little incentive to seek out the payment functions that are optimal for cer-
tain types of their enrollees in their contacts with certain types of health care providers. 
For, identifying these functions - and even more so negotiating their implementation -
constitutes an arduous task. Until the new Law on Health Insurance of 1994 came into 
force, social health insurers in Switzerland were not exposed to competition. Even under 
the new law, any physician who is prepared to apply the negotiated fee schedule, must be 
accepted by social health insurance (any-willing-provider clause). Moreover, federal 
regulation continues to impose uniformity of hospital fees within a given canton and to 
encourage national uniformity of fee schedules for physicians, overlooking the fact that 
the way the providers of health care are paid is an important dimension of competition 
between insurers. The situation is no different in the Netherlands, a country hailed for its 
pro-competitive reform in the financing of health care (VAN DE VEN, 1991). 
With regard to private health insurance, Swiss companies operated a cartel that was 
lifted only recently, before the conclusion of the insurance agreement with the European 
Union in 1992. This lack of competition has prevented them from developing fee sche-
dules in the interest of their enrollees; rather, they have been limiting themselves to sim-
ply paying whatever the billing. This seems to be the standard in other countries as well; 
in Germany e.g., private health insurers simply pay a multiple of the fees negotiated by 
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their social counterparts. The theoretical findings of this paper therefore must await the 
advent of more full-blown competition in both social and private health insurance to be 
confronted with the empirical evidence. 
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SUMMARY 
Health policy makers know that their decisions affect the chances of well-being and sur-
vival of individuals and that they implicitly are valuing human lives. Evidence with re-
gard to willingness-to-pay (WTP) informs about the value individuals themselves put 
on these chances; it thus holds the promise of contributing to consistent decisions that 
lead to an improved benefit-cost ratio of health services for (potential) patients. How-
ever, such improvement is more likely if information about WTP is used by competing 
health insurers rather than the government. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Gesundheitspolitiker wissen, dass ihre Entscheidungen die Chancen für Wohlbefin-
den und Überleben der Individuen verändern und dass sie deshalb implizit menschliches 
Leben bewerten. Informationen über die Zahlungsbereitschaft legen den Wert offen, 
den die Individuen selbst auf solche Chancen legen. Dadurch können sie zu konsisten-
ten Entscheidungen beitragen, welche das Nutzen-Kosten-Verhältnis der Gesundheits-
leistungen für (potentielle) Patienten verbessern. Eine solche Verbesserung ist jedoch 
vor allem dann wahrscheinlich, wenn ein dem Wettbewerb ausgesetzter Krankenversi-
cherer und nicht die Regierung über die Zahlungsbereitschaft Bescheid weiss. 
RESUME 
Les décideurs en matière de santé publique savent que leurs décisions affectent les chan-
ces de bien-être et de survie des individus et qu'implicitement ils donnent un prix à la vie 
humaine. Les données relatives à la disposition à payer fournissent des indications quant 
à la valeur que les individus eux-mêmes attribuent à ces chances. Elles contribuent ainsi 
à ce que soient prises des décisions cohérentes et qui améliorent le ratio coûts-bénéfices 
des services de santé à disposition des patients potentiels. Une telle amélioration est ce-
pendant plus probable si les données relatives à la disposition à payer sont utilisées par 
des assureurs-maladie dans un marché concurrentiel plutôt que par le gouvernement. 
